Lessons from Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings V. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. by Ho, Cynthia M.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 23 | Issue 3 Article 3
2007
Lessons from Laboratory Corp. of America
Holdings V. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
Cynthia M. Ho
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Cynthia M. Ho, Lessons from Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings V. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 23 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J.
463 (2006).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol23/iss3/3
LESSONS FROM LABORATORY CORP. OF
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Abstract
This article provides reflections on the scope of patentable
subject matter, using the Supreme Court's recent consideration of
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc. as a springboard for discussion. A brief introduction to the case
and the current standard of patentable subject matter are provided as
a backdrop for discussion of the role of patentable subject matter in
the overall scheme of patentability and patent enforcement. In
addition, this article addresses potential repercussions of the case
within the judicial and legislative arenas. This article concludes by
offering some broad-based issues for consideration, including both
domestic and international implications.
t Associate Professor of Law, Vickrey Research Professor and Director of the Intellectual
Property & Technology Program, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world of patentable subject matter may soon be subject to a
seismic shift. Initial rumblings were heard when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the issue of patentable subject matter in
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America
Holdings - an issue seemingly crafted out of whole cloth since neither
party had litigated the issue. Expectations of a clear metric in this area
where dashed when the Court ultimately dismissed certiorari as
improvidently granted. However the dissenting opinion to the
dismissal directly challenged the standard of patentable subject
matter' that the Federal Circuit, the court with exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals in patent cases, has been applying for the last decade.2
Although the dismissal of certiorari in Metabolite leaves patent
lawyers waiting for a final conclusion from the Court on the proper
scope of patentable subject matter, other institutional bodies continue
to struggle with this issue. Until the Court declares a new standard of
patentability, the Federal Circuit will likely continue to apply its
standard of looking at whether an invention produces a "useful,
concrete and tangible result," which has undeniably opened the
patentable subject matter door to new categories of inventions, such
as business methods.3 Whether the Federal Circuit will allow further
categories of inventions, such as electrical signals disembodied from a
standard storage medium, to be patentable remains open to question
as the Federal Circuit currently considers the case In re Nuijten. In
addition, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") Board of
Appeals has taken different positions on whether the scope of
patentable subject matter should be limited by engrafting a
1. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2926 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). There were twenty amicus briefs filed in this case, which the dissenting
Justices suggested as being adequately thorough, such that further proceedings were likely to
provide only diminishing returns. See id. at 2926.
2. Id. at 2928 (noting that the Supreme Court has never approved the Federal Circuit test
of patentable subject matter that focuses on whether an invention "produces 'a useful, concrete,
and tangible result') (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
3. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comms., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank,
149 F.3d 1368.
4. In re Nuijten, No. 2006-1371 (Fed. Cir. filed Mar. 17, 2006) (appealing the decision
of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that
"signals" are not patentable subject matter).
[ ol. 23
LESSONS FROM LABORA TORY CORP.
technological arts requirement on inventions. 5 Moreover, public
perceptions of an unduly broad scope of patentable subject matter are
again percolating, with the latest result being embodied in a bill to
limit patentability on methods of achieving tax avoidance.6
The appropriate scope of patentable subject matter is a prime
topic for consideration by courts and commentators alike. This article
focuses on the impact and import of the dissent from the dismissal of
certiorari in Metabolite as a possible predictor of Supreme Court
clarification on the issue. At a minimum, this article hopes to provide
some lessons from the Court's consideration of the case that may be
useful for both pending and future cases.
This article begins in Section II with a review of the procedural
history of Metabolite, including the subject matter of the invention. A
brief review of the claim at issue provides context to discussing future
directions in the area. Section III considers the implications of
Metabolite with respect to future Supreme Court cases. Section IV
outlines potential repercussions of Metabolite beyond the Supreme
Court. Section V considers implications of the case for consideration
by other institutional actors involved in patentable subject matter.
Finally, Section V concludes with some remaining questions for
consideration by policy-makers at all levels.
II. BACKGROUND
To help set the stage for discussion of the future of patentable
subject matter, this section begins with the case that captured the
attention of the Supreme Court. In addition, the prevailing standard
for evaluating patentable subject matter, as articulated by both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit are presented.
A. Metabolite
The patentable subject matter issue that intrigued at least four
Justices of the Supreme Court - the requirement for granting
5. Ex parte Bilski, App. No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. 2006) (holding that there is a
technological arts requirement); Exparte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1388 (B.P.A.I. 2005)
(holding that there is no "technological arts" requirement for patentable subject matter, but with
strong dissents from two of the five judges).
6. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 11 0th Cong. § 303 (2007) (proposing to
amend the patent act to bar patenting of "invention[s] ... designed to minimize, avoid, defer, or
otherwise affect liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax" in context of the broader tax
bill); see also Press Release, Carl Levin, U.S. Sen., Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act (Feb. 17, 2007), http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=269479.
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certiorari - began in a seemingly unlikely case. Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings ("LabCorp") was sued for contributory patent
infringement because it sold a test to doctors that allegedly used the
plaintiffs patented method to evaluate patient blood for certain key
vitamin deficiency levels without authorization. 8 However, despite the
fact that LabCorp was ultimately found liable for willfully infringing,
there are facts that indicate LabCorp had in fact taken affirmative
actions to respect the rights of the patent holder. For example,
LabCorp had accepted a license under the patent-in-suit and duly
made payments to the patentee for years. 9 The patent infringement
dispute arose when LabCorp believed that it was permitted to
terminate the license agreement in accordance with the contract
terms.10
Metabolite brought suit against LabCorp based on a single claim
that encompassed a far broader scope of subject matter than the
narrower claims originally licensed.ll LabCorp raised a number of
defenses, including that the claim was invalid for being overbroad and
indefinite. 12 Despite mounting a vigorous defense against the patent,
LabCorp never explicitly raised patentable subject matter as an
7. In addition, although it is true that a plurality of the Justices agree to hear the case, the
agreement may be even less uniform given that eight of the nine Justices use a "pool" system
whereby their clerks take turns writing up summaries of cert petitions upon which the Justices
decide whether to grant certiorari. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Cert Pool,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certpool.
8. Although not party to the lawsuit, doctors who used LabCorp's test were found to be
directly infringing the patented method by "correlating" the patient's vitamin levels with known
standards. See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (noting substantial evidence to support
the jury verdict that doctors using assays from LabCorp carried out the correlating step of the
patent).
9. See id. at 1359.
10. The license permitted LabCorp "to terminate the agreement if 'a more cost effective
commercial alternative is available that does not infringe a valid and enforceable claim of the
patent." Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2923 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). When LabCorp in good faith began using a procedure from Abbott
Laboratories that LabCorp believed to be far superior, it ceased paying royalties. Id.
11. Id. at 2923-24.
12. Id. at 2924. Although LabCorp challenged the patent claim on grounds of
indefiniteness, lack of written description, enablement, anticipation and obviousness, it was
unable to establish invalidity of the claim based on any of these defenses - at least not by the
clear and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of validity for
all issued patents. See Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1367-68 (affirming district court rejection of
invalidity defenses); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (presumption of validity).
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issue. 13 As a matter of basic pleading rules, affirmative defenses are
waived and precluded from consideration at trial when they are not
timely included in initial pleadings. 14 Indeed, lack of patentable
subject matter was not expressly mentioned in any of the three
questions LabCorp posed to the Court in its petition for certiorari.'
5
The Court divined a subject matter issue from a question that
seemed to raise ambiguous issues of patent scope. In particular, the
Court focused on the question of
[w]hether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed,
and non-enabling step directing a party simply to 'correlat[e]' test
results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific
relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor
necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the
relationship after looking at a test result.
16
Unlike the other two questions posed in the original certiorari
grant, this omnibus question suggests a relationship between patent
infringement and different bases of invalidity. While it is true that an
invalid patent cannot be infringed, this question, as posed, seems to
try to revisit validity issues that are not explicitly presented for
certiorari. In addition, the question suggests that whether a claim is
invalid under the three different bases of invalidity under section
13. Indeed, the Solicitor General argued against the grant of certiorari, in part, based on
the fact that LabCorp had failed to raise the issue. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 15, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3533248.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1278 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that lower courts "virtually
universal[ly]" hold that failure to plead an affirmative defense results in waiver of the defense
and exclusion from the case); see also Brief for Respondents at 11, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921
(No. 04-607), 2006 WL 303905 (noting that "it is unlikely that there has ever been another case
in the annals of this Court in which a party so clearly embraced every avenue for forfeiting a
right, in every court along the way.").
15. The precise questions posed were as follows:
I. Whether liability can be imposed for willfully inducing patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) based solely on evidence that a party has
disseminated a basic scientific fact to others.
2. Whether an express limitation in a patent claim can be ignored so as to
allow the patent to cover the exact opposite of what was claimed.
3. Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed and non-
enabling step directing a party simply to "correlat[e]" test results can
validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship used in
medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily infringes the patent
merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test result.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526.
16. Id.
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1 12,17 might be tied to the proper scope of a patent right. While it is
unclear what the precise strategic rationale was for this question, the
petitioner was clearly successful in obtaining the attention of the
Court. The inclusion of the phrase "basic scientific relationship"
seemed to pique the Court's interest that this was a case involving a
question of patentable subject matter and, in particular, whether the
claim was invalid because it attempted to claim a natural phenomena
or scientific relationship in violation of prior Court precedent.
18
An initial puzzle is why the Court was interested in addressing
patentable subject matter issue when it was neither squarely raised in
the petition, nor considered below. Indeed, lack of lower court
consideration is often sound justification to deny consideration of an
issue. However, some members of the Court seemed to believe that
the "essence" of the patentable subject matter objection was argued
below in the context of some of the invalidity arguments. '9 In
addition, the Court has inherent discretion to overlook petitioner's
failure to raise an issue in lower courts.2z If the opinion of the
dissenting Justices is any indication of the views of the full Court,
some Justices may have strong feelings both about whether the
Federal Circuit is misapplying the standard for patentable subject
matter, as well as the policy implications of an erroneous scope of
patentable subject matter. For example, the dissenting Justices noted
that an overly expansive breadth of patentable subject matter might
21actually undermine public health as well as scientific progress.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
18. An unanswered question is why the Court chose to ignore the stated question
regarding whether the claim was indefinite, undescribed and non-enabling - all legitimate
grounds for challenging the validity of a patent and all defenses properly raised below. A
cynical perspective might be that these technical defenses are difficult to understand, or, at a
minimum, less interesting than revisiting patentable subject matter in light of the seemingly
ever-expansive scope of patentable subject matter.
19. Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. at 2925 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that because
LabCorp argued that the claim was so vague that it would permit an improper monopoly over a
basic scientific fact, it must be invalid). Moreover, sidestepping the fact that the only prior
discussion related to § 112, rather than § 101, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), the dissenting Justices
believed that the procedural argument was necessarily rejected by reading into the fact that the
Court granted certiorari despite advice to the contrary by the Solicitor General. Id. at 2926
(noting that "after considering the Solicitor General's advice not to hear the case (primarily
based upon LabCorp's failure to refer to 35 U.S.C. § 101), we rejected that advice, thereby
,necessarily consider[ing] and reject[ing] that contention as basis for denying review."')
(citation omitted).
20. See SUP. CT. R. 15.2; see also Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. at 2927-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 23
LESSONS FROM LABORA TORY CORP.
This article does not linger on a definitive interpretation of the
claim at issue. A wide perspective of interpretations is already
reflected in amici briefs and the interpretation is essentially a moot
point.22 Nonetheless, a brief review is helpful to see both why the
defendant originally assumed that there was no issue of patentable
subject matter, as well as why many amici viewed the case as a
vehicle for their perspectives on the scope of patentable subject
matter.
The sole claim at issue, claim 13, begins by stating "[a] method
for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded
animals" comprised of two steps.23 The steps are stated as comprising
"assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine;
and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. '2 4 In other words, the
patented method comprised a method of correlating the bodily level
of a protein with a vitamin B deficiency.
While methods may be patentable subject matter, the issue here
was whether the method was barred by a common law doctrine
precluding the patenting of a natural phenomenon.25 In particular, the
question was whether the patented method was tantamount to simply
observing natural phenomena. 26 One brief suggested a doctor would
infringe by merely using his medical judgment in correlating the
blood protein level with the vitamin deficiency. 27 However,
infringement is only possible when every element of the claimed
invention is performed 28 - a full reading of the claim suggests that
merely thinking about the numbers would not constitute infringement
since the doctor would not perform the assay step in his or her head.
22. Some briefs suggested that the invention covered the thought processes of a physician
thinking about a basic scientific relationship, or that upholding the validity of the claim would
infringe on free speech. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 14, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-
607), 2005 WL 3543099; see also Brief of the Public Patent Foundation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 15, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3597813
(suggesting that upholding the claim would "in effect, prevent the patent from generating or
communicating any information that could help other would-be inventors" because all
inferences would result in infringement).
23. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col.41, 1. 58-65 (filed Nov. 20, 1986).
24. Id.
25. Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 2923.
27. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607), 2005 WL
598181.
28. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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B. The Standard(s) of Patentable Subject Matter
One lingering issue after Metabolite lies in the two potentially
different standards enunciated by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit. In particular, the Federal Circuit has found business method
patents to be patentable under a standard that looks at whether an
invention "transforms" an object, or whether the invention produces a
useful, concrete or tangible result.29 The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, has never embraced such a standard. 30 As the Justices
dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari in Metabolite noted: "this
Court has never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the
statement would cover instances where the Court has held the
contrary., 3 Rather, the dissenting Justices observed that the relevant
test is whether patentable subject matter is barred because the claim
covers a law of nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas, which are
all excluded as a matter of principle.
3 2
Interestingly, the patent act itself - which would be the typical
starting place for considering the scope of patentable subject matter -
does not directly support either position. The applicable statutory
language here is relatively sparse; the federal patent act provides that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 33 . . . or
"134any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent ....
No explicit exclusions follow this broad language. Although there are
some exclusions from patentability, 35 Congress has declined to follow
the practice of many other countries that expressly exclude medical
procedures, mathematical methods, plant or animal varieties, and
inventions that are contrary to morality.36
29. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30. Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2922.
33. The invention at here seems to clearly be a process. The Patent Act simply defines a
process as a "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process ... " 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b) (2000).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
35. One clear exclusion is for inventions that are "useful solely in the utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon." 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000).
However, this exclusion is notably not within the patent act itself. One bar to patentability that is
located within the patent act - although not as an express limit to patentable subject matter - is a
bar on inventions whose publication or disclosure might be detrimental to national security. 35
U.S.C. § 181 (2000).
36. See, e.g. European Patent Convention art. 52(4)-53, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268,
available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/index.html (twelfth revision as of
Apr. 2006); see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
[Vol. 23
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Although the general statutory framework does not include any
explicit exclusion from patentability, courts have nonetheless
interpreted the minimalist language to have some prohibitions.
Although most prohibitions have evolved to extinction over time,
there still seems to be a bar on patenting abstract concepts,
mathematical algorithms and scientific principles.37 The Court's own
decisions have crafted a more nuanced distinction between attempts
to patent algorithms per se (unpatentable under Parker v. Flook31)
versus methods that utilize a mathematical formula or algorithm in
one step of a multi-step process (patentable process under Diamond v.
Diehr39). However, the Court has admitted that determining when the
exclusion applies "is not easy to define.,
40
Without explicitly jettisoning the bar to patentability for natural
phenomena, the Federal Circuit has created an alternative framework
for evaluating patentable subject matter. In particular, for method
claims since the 1998 case of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit has found
patentable subject matter where an invention "produces 'a useful,
concrete and tangible result. ' -41 Based upon this standard, the Federal
27.2-3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legale/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
37. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980). See also Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility 8
(Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-68, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=951800 (noting that courts and
commentators have traditionally agreed that laws of nature, abstract ideas and naturally-
occurring physical phenomena are unpatentable). On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has
dispensed with any perceptions of a per se bar to either computer-related art, or business
methods. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Similarly, the mental
steps doctrine has been largely disposed of since In re Musgrave. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, Syllogistic
and Other 36-37 (Aug. 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Intellectual Prop.
Scholars Conference), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Collins.doc.
38. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
39. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
40. Although the opinion quotes from legendary cases concerning some examples that are
clearly excluded, it also admits that such categories are "not easy to define." Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2926 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court quotes from Flook that "[tihe line between a patentable 'process' and an
unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear," as well as from a federal appellate court decision
on the scope of copyrightable subject matter. Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 589).
41. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373; see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comms., Inc., 172
F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Circuit has opened the door for business method patents and the
42USPTO has followed suit by issuing patents in this area. In addition,
the USPTO has revised its guidelines for evaluating patentable
subject matter to not only address this standard, but also to clarify that
there is no requirement that the invention be within a technical art.4 3
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT
At a minimum, Metabolite seems to signal that some Justices are
ready to revisit the scope of patentable subject matter despite the fact
that a 7-2 majority of the Court affirmed a broad scope of patentable
subject matter just five years ago in J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred International, Inc.44 In J.E.M the Court strongly affirmed the
42. Indeed, there is a dedicated web page within the USPTO site directed to business
method patents. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Business Methods,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2007) (providing statistics, as
well, as guidelines for successfully preparing and prosecuting business method applications).
See also COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON. BOARD
ON SCI., TECH., AND ECON. POLICY, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIs., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 55-57 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004), available
at http://books.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT]
(describing growth in business method patent applications in the wake of the State Street Bank
decision, as well as the results of the USPTO's initiative for extra review of class 705 - often
synonymous with business method applications - that indicated a distinct decline in the number
of issued business method patents). Whether business methods as a class should be patentable or
reviewed differently than other classes of inventions is a separate question for which there is
ample scholarly attention. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of
Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2006); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method
Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003) (presenting evidence to suggest that business
method patents are no less valid than other types of patents); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (providing an early perspective on the emergence
on business method patents).
43. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF
PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 42 (2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opapreognotice/guidelineslO1-20051026.pdf; see
also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Overview of Interim Guidelines for Subject Matter
Eligibility,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/compexam/interim-guide-subj-mattereligibility.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2007) (clarifying that an invention no longer need not be within a
"technological art" to qualify as patentable subject matter).
44. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). In an
interesting parallel to Metabolite, at the time certiorari was granted for J.E.M, some speculated
that the Court's decision might set a new path for patentable subject matter because the issue of
whether plants were patentable was thought to have been a long-settled issue by most patent
practitioners. However, unlike Metabolite, where the Court injected the issue of patentable
subject matter for the first time, one of the parties to J.E.M. did affirmatively raise the issue of
patentable subject matter as an affirmative defense, such that the issue was thoroughly discussed
and considered by lower courts.
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broad scope of patentability set forth in Diamond v. Chakrabarty in
holding plants within the scope of patent law despite the fact that
other types of protection were available.45 The Court gave weight not
only to its prior precedent in Chakrabarty, but also the views of the
USPTO.46 This deference is in sharp contrast to the suggestion of the
dissenting Metabolite Justices that directly challenge the Federal
Circuit standard.
Moreover, the comments of the dissenting Metabolite Justices suggest
a possibly important shift in focus for policy considerations
underlying patentable subject matter.47 These three Justices seem
concerned with the impact of patentable subject matter on a variety of
issues, including health care costs, as well as scientific research.48 The
opinion freely admits that "monetary incentives may matter" to
scientific research, but that exclusion is nevertheless appropriate in
some instances because of a necessary balance. 49 The opinion boldly
states that "the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much
patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,'... by impeding the free exchange of
information. . . ,50 While the impact of patent rights on scientific
research and norms is not a new concept among academic realms, it
has not typically been discussed as an independent factor in cases
involving patentable subject matter.
This is in contrast to the presumptive need for patent incentives
that played a heavy role in Chakrabarty.51 The Chakrabarty Court -
at least the five Justices in the majority opinion - placed a clear
emphasis on providing a patent incentive to accelerate research
45. Id. at 124.
46. The opinion further noted that since Chakrabarty, the USPTO Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences explicitly found plants to be included within the scope of patentable
subject matter and that "the [USPTO] has had an unbroken practice of conferring utility patents
for plants." Id. at 125.
47. Moreover, in contrast to some prior Court decisions that seemed to distance patent
policy from the proper realm of judicial oversight, the dissenting opinion suggests that the
judiciary not only explicitly consider policy implications, but possibly lead the way for
Congress.
48. Within the introductory paragraphs of the opinion, Justice Breyer noted that "those
who engage in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as patients depend upon
proper health care, might well benefit from this Court's authoritative answer." Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
51. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) ("Whether respondent's
claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of
reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all.").
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without concern for possible risk in the then-fledgling area of genetic
research. Moreover, the majority in Chakrabarty paid no heed to the
dissent's call for balance and caution in the area of patentable subject
matter, or the idea that Congress was better situated to address policy
issues.53 Rather, the majority blithely remarked that pregnant policy
issues were simply beyond the realm of judicial interpretation and not
necessary to consider unless and until Congress amended what it
perceived to be a broad scope of patentable subject matter.5 4
The Chakrabarty opinion is particularly interesting in a broader
historical context since the Court had previously taken a more
cautious approach to patentable subject matter cases. The two
Supreme Court cases on patentable subject matter immediately
preceding Chakrabarty both found the inventions at issue
unpatentable and also articulated a conservative approach to new
technology. Only two years before Chakrabarty, the majority in
Parker v. Flook, noted that the Court should "proceed cautiously" in
the area of computer programs.56 The Court specifically noted that its
decision was not intended to suggest that patent protection should be
barred from computer programs, but suggested instead that since the
area was wholly unforeseen by Congress, Congress would be in a
better position as a matter of policy to decide whether to grant
protection, and, if so, the extent of such protection.57 Similarly, in
Gottschalk v Benson, the Court was sympathetic to "considerable
problems" that would be raised for the USPTO examination process,
such that Congress would be in the best position to decide.58
IV. MOVING BEYOND THE SUPREME COURT
This section examines the possible implications of Metabolite
beyond the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court clearly has
the power to declare the law of the land, it does not retain sole
authority in creating laws. Rather, Congress can clearly pass laws
59
52. Id. at 316-17.
53. Id. at 319 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 317 (majority opinion).
55. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64 (1972).
56. Flook, 437 U.S. at 596.
57. Id. at 595-96.
58. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
59. For example, Congress has passed legislation to explicitly overrule judicial decisions.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000) (overruling U.S. Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth
Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)).
[Vol. 23
]LESSONS FROM LABORA TORY CORP.
and even the Federal Circuit can - and has - created new laws,6°
subject to possible review by the Court. This section focuses on the
impact of Metabolite for modification of patent laws by actors beyond
the Court.
A. Patent Reform - Federal Circuit Reconsideration?
Perhaps the most immediate impact of Metabolite will be on
Federal Circuit jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit is uniquely poised
to revisit the standard of patentable subject matter as the single Court
of Appeals to hear patent cases decided by both federal district courts,
as well as appeals from the USPTO.61 Moreover, the Metabolite
dissent clearly puts the Federal Circuit on notice that at least three
Justices disagree with its standard of patentable subject matter.62
While the Federal Circuit is under no obligation to revisit its
jurisprudence on the issue, let alone defend its standard, recent history
suggests that the Federal Circuit is in fact sensitive and responsive to
criticism. For example, since the Court granted certiorari in Teleflex,
Inc. v. KSR International Co. to evaluate the nonobviousness
standard,63 the Federal Circuit has issued a series of opinions on the
same issue that go to great lengths in defending its standard.64 Indeed,
since Metabolite, the Federal Circuit has already heard oral arguments
regarding the scope of patentable subject matter with another case
possibly pending. 65 Whether the Federal Circuit will take this
60. While the Federal Circuit probably considers itself to interpret, rather than create new
law wholesale, most consider the Federal Circuit to have indisputably expanded the scope of
patentable subject matter since the State Street Bank decision. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra
note 42, at 43-44 (explaining how the Federal Circuit moved beyond the Supreme Court
jurisprudence in In re Alappat, as well as with State Street Bank and AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2), (4)(A)-(C) (2000).
62. Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? Twenty
Years of Design Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 195, 199 (1985).
63. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (June 26, 2006) (No. 04-1350).
64. See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding patent obvious and reversing district court decision to the
contrary); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding patents
obvious); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding patent
obvious in reversal of district court decision); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(affirming rejection of patent application as obvious).
65. The Federal Circuit has already heard oral arguments in the case ofIn re Nui'ten. As
of the time of publication, no opinion was yet available. In addition, Ex parte Bilski is a case that
has been appealed to the Federal Circuit from the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals. See supra
notes 4-5.
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opportunity to defend its current standard, or modify it, remains to be
seen.
B. Patent Reform - Congressional Action?
In addition to possible re-evaluation of the scope of patentable
subject matter by the Federal Circuit, Metabolite may also impact the
broader movement for congressional patent reform. There has long
been a call for reform of the U.S. patent system, with extensive bills
proposed in the last session of Congress.66 On the other hand, to date,
the extensive proposals do not include suggestions for amending
patentable subject matter; rather, the proposals suggest changes to
what is considered prior art, as well as opportunities for post-grant
opposition as methods to minimize weak, or even invalid, patents.67
Metabolite may help challenge the long-prevailing assumption that
the scope of patentable subject matter is proper. Many have
previously assumed that a broad scope of patentable subject matter is
important to promote innovation without citing any evidence, or
decline to suggest any changes because of an assumption that
modification is politically impossible.68
Metabolite may already be having an impact on congressional
discussions of patentable subject matter. In the short time since the
decision, two bills have been introduced in Congress to limit
patentable subject matter - one involving controversial tax avoidance
66. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patents Depend
on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795,
109th Cong. (2005). In addition, legislative proposals for patent reform are anticipated shortly in
the current Congress. See, e.g., Susan Decker, US Businesses Laud 'Season for Patent Reform,'
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 13, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/13/business/patents.php; Legislation/Intellectual Property:
House 1P Panel's Priorities Include PTO Oversight, Patent Reform, Music Licensing, 73
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIR'S PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 554 (2007).
67. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 6 (2006) (detailing post-grant
review proceedings).
68. See, e.g., FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 43 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter INNOVATION REPORT] (suggesting
that promotion of innovation should be "presumed unless empirical evidence to the contrary
exists"); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT 115, 126 (2004); NAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 44; but see Peter S. Menell, A
Method for Reforming the Patent System 9-12 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 958089, 2007), available at
http:/ssm.com/abstract=958089 (criticizing the National Academy of Sciences report, as well as
the Jaffe and Lemer report for failing to provide a careful analysis of the appropriate scope of
patentable subject matter).
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schemes, and another involving gene patents.69 While tax avoidance
patents (typically business patents) are a recent genre, gene patenting
is not new. Indeed, in the initial remarks accompanying the
legislation, Representative Becerra noted that many gene patents have
been issued and indicated a desire to halt further patenting in this
area, although the bill would not implicate existing patents. 70 Whether
further evaluation of the issue will ultimately alter the patent
landscape is unclear. After all, recent attempts to amend the scope of
patentable subject matter have failed despite the passage of some
legislation. For example, although repeated attempts to exclude
medical procedures from the scope of patentable subject matter have
failed,7' the last attempt resulted in an amendment to the patent act
that limits liability of medical doctors 72 Another recent example
involved a failed attempt to bar human-like inventions from the scope
of patentable subject matter 73 that was more successful upon
reincarnation as a limit to USPTO funding for examination of
applications involving the same subject matter.74 In both of these
examples, while some legislation passed, rhetoric concerning the
importance of the patent incentive steered action away from
modifying the scope of patentable subject matter.75 Moreover, groups
that strongly protested prior attempts to modify the standard, such as
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, would likely oppose
similar efforts in the future.
69. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 303 (2007); Genomic
Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).
70. 153 CONG. REc. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra).
71. Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995)
(proposing to amend the scope of subject matter to exclude certain medical procedures).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). In effect the amendment produces the same result as a
limit on patentable subject matter from the perspective of medical doctors since they are not
liable; however, for the patent holder, there is an important distinction since secondary actors
may be sued for infringement under the current system.
73. In particular, Senator Brownback had proposed an amendment to a terrorism bill
(providing for federal funding to insurance companies) that included an amendment to narrow
the scope of patentable subject matter. 148 CONG. REC. S5556 (2002).
74. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101
(2004).
75. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Funding Bill Gets Clause on Embryo Patents, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 2003, at A04 (noting concern of biotechnology industry that legislation would
prematurely limit incentives on a promising area of research); Julie Kimbrough, CAMR: Anti-
Patent Legislation Could Cripple Medical Research; Patient Groups, Researchers, Universities
Voice Opposition, SCIENCE BLOC, Nov. 19, 2003,
http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/K/4/pub4765.html (arguing against an
overly broad ban on patentable subject matter for fear that it will reduce research incentives and
negatively impact the competitive position of the United States in the global economy).
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Beyond past history, the substantive content of both of the
pending proposals for amending patentable subject matter are also
questionable. Both proposals provide short, yet vague, bars from
patentability. 76 The proposed bar on human material is particularly
likely to elicit objections from the same biotechnology interests that
objected to other recent proposals. In addition, the genesis for the bill
seems to reflect less of the nuanced concerns of the dissenting
Metabolite Justices in balancing patent incentives against health
policy, and more of a misunderstanding of fundamental patent law, or
at least some of its nuances. For example, the introductory remarks to
the gene patent bill erroneously suggest that patents on gene
sequences result in natural human genetic material being owned;
however, only isolated gene sequences can be patented.77 In addition,
while some statements regarding the negative impact of gene patents
on research scientists have validity, there is no reflection concerning
whether limiting patentable subject matter is the best way to provide a
balance that maintains the incentive for innovation.
78
V. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
This section provides some continuing issues for consideration
that stem from the original discussion of Metabolite. Although a full
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, this
section aims to outline issues for future consideration by all
institutional actors involved with the scope of patentable subject
matter.
A. What Is the Proper Role of Patentable Subject Matter?
In evaluating what courts or Congress should strive for in
addressing patentable subject matter, a fundamental question is the
purpose of this requirement in the context of patentability generally.
As every student of patent law is well aware, patentable subject
76. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 303 (2007) (proposing to bar
patents where "the invention is designed to minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise affect the
liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax"); see also Genomic Research and Accessibility
Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing to amend the patent act to state that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may be obtained for a nucleotide
sequence, or its functions or correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies.").
77. See 153 CONG. REC E315, E316 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra)
(asserting that "who we are is owned by someone else.").
78. See generally id (providing no discussion of a need to balance patent incentives with
policy, other than a conclusory and unsupported statement that the act "does not hamper
invention .... Medical innovation and economic advancement will occur if the study of genes is
allowed to happen unabated.").
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matter is merely one requirement of patentability. 79 Even if an
invention is deemed within the scope of patentable subject matter, it
must still be considered new, useful and nonobvious to be
patentable . 80 However, there is sometimes a tendency to conflate
consideration of the appropriate scope of patentable subject matter
with other requirements of patentability, without considering whether
each requirement should be serving independent purposes. 81
An important question is whether patentable subject matter
should intentionally serve an independent or duplicative function to
the doctrines of novelty and nonobviousness? In particular, given
recent criticisms that the bar for novelty and, especially,
nonobviousness are too low, or at least difficult to apply rigorously,
should patentable subject matter be used to police the proper scope of
patents? 82 Or, should such criticisms be addressed directly by
improving application of novelty and nonobviousness standards,
rather than indirectly by invoking patentable subject matter?
Alternatively, what harm is there from having patentable subject
matter serve as a gatekeeper to patentability?83 A possible harm is that
narrowing the standard of patentable subject matter may result in a
complete bar to patents of inventions that might in fact benefit
society. While it is true that issued patents may be impacted by either
a more narrow scope of subject matter or more rigorous application of
other standards, this does not address the policy question of whether
79. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 68, at 27-28 (noting in a book written by
economists for the general public, that while "U.S. courts have become progressively more
generous in determining what subject matter is indeed patentable," that "is not the end of the
story" since there are three other tests - utility, novelty and nonobviousness).
80. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000). Moreover the patent application must provide an
adequate description of the invention that enables someone of skill in the art to make and use the
invention. Id. § 112.
81. This was aptly noted by the dissent in Parker v. Flook. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority confuses patentable subject matter
with the standard of patentability under the doctrines of novelty and nonobviousness). Similarly,
the current Federal Circuit standard of patentability incorporates utility, even though that is a
separate requirement. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
82. Indeed, recent studies of U.S. patent laws have in fact suggested that, at least for
some types of technologies, these standards have not been applied in a sufficiently rigorous
manner. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 95.
83. Indeed, there has been a suggestion that courts have abdicated the gate-keeping
function of patentable subject matter through the unduly weak standard. See, e.g., David S.
Olson, Patentable Subject Matter: The Problem of the Absent Gatekeeper 1 (Sept. 27, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Sch. Ctr. for Internet and Soc'y),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=933167.
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patentable subject matter should perform a duplicative gate-keeping
role.
In considering the role of patentable subject matter, courts and
Congress should be conscious of the tendency of some to use
patentable subject matter as a solution for other problems. For
example, the Supreme Court has been repeatedly asked to utilize
patentable subject matter to bar certain technologies from
patentability on questionable policy grounds. For example, during the
infancy of the computer software era, the USPTO requested - and
obtained - Court approval for denying computer software from the
scope of patentable subject matter when the USPTO had logistical
problems in applying other requirements of patentability. 84 In
particular, the USPTO was concerned that it had an inadequate library
of prior art, such that too many invalid patents might issue.85 While
the USPTO's concern may have been valid, other methods of
addressing the prior art problem such as allowing patents to be
opposed, or bolstering the prior art collection would seem to be more
direct solutions than contorting the doctrine of patentable subject
matter.
B. Patent Rights
In addition to the relationship amongst various patentability
requirements, the scope of patent rights may also need to be revisited.
After all, a broad scope of patentable subject matter and even patents
need not result in an impediment to research if there is a broader
scope of exceptions to the enforcement of patent rights. Accordingly,
the fears of the dissenting opinion in Metabolite could be addressed
by modifying patent standards to provide some exceptions from
patent infringement. Indeed, domestic patent laws provide far more
exclusivity to the patent owner than most other countries. For
example, there is no general experimental use exception to
patentability - even for academic researchers.86 Accordingly, recent
84. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (noting that the USPTO was
concerned about an inability to examine computer software applications because of a lack of
relevant prior art); see also Flook, 437 U.S. at 587-88 (majority opinion) (noting that the
USPTO Commissioner petition for certiorari suggested that Court intervention was needed to
reverse the lower court finding of patentability for fear of a flood of USPTO applications).
85. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 72 (suggesting the Court was sensitive to an indirect attempt
to patent computer programs in light of the USPTO's assertion of difficulty in examining
computer programs due to limited prior art available to the USPTO).
86. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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policy reports have argued for an explicit statutory exception for
scientific research.87
The impact of patent rights is particularly an issue for health
care, as noted by the dissenting Metabolite Justices. 88 These Justices,
as well as amici briefs, highlight a critical need to revisit the current
balance of patent rights to assess whether they promote innovation at
too great a cost to other values, such as health care access. 89 The
rising costs of health care further support consideration of whether
patents unduly contribute to such costs - either through an overly
broad scope of patentable subject matter, or the lack of exceptions to
patent rights. While pharmaceutical companies repeatedly insist that
patents are crucial to promoting necessary research that benefits the
public overall, there is a clear tension between providing maximal
patent rights and maximum health care. The conflict is most extreme
in less developed countries, but the same issues exist in the United
States where patients may be precluded from necessary medical care
because patented drugs or tests are cost-prohibitive. 90 The need to
address this policy concern has been noted in policy studies 91 and
87. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 110-11. Indeed, even before Madey v. Duke
University, there have been repeated proposals to embrace a more explicit experimental use
provision. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward
a Doctrine of Fair Use in PatentLaw, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000).
88. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2928-29
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Brief of the American Heart Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
27-28, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3561169; Brief for the American
Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 23-24, Metabolite, 126 S.
Ct. 2921 (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3597812.
90. In fact, some might suggest that the "working poor" in the United States suffer the
most since the United States does not provide universal health care, such that patented medical
treatment is often completely out of reach for the many Americans without health insurance.
91. See generally AUSTL. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., PATENTS AND
EXPERIMENTAL USE OPTIONS PAPER (2004), available at
http://www.acip.gov.au/library/Experimental/20Use /200ptions /2OPaper%/ 2OA.pdf
SVEN JR. BOSTYN, EUROPEAN COMM'N, PATENTING DNA SEQUENCES AND SCOPE OF
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN EVALUATION, BACKGROUND STUDY FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS (2004), available at
http://bookshop.europa.eu/eubookshop/FileCache/PUBPDF/KINA21122ENC/KINA21122ENC
002.pdf; W.R. CORNISH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS) AND GENETICS: A
STUDY INTO THE IMPACT AND MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE
HEALTHCARE SECTOR (2003), available at http://www.phgu.org.uk/pages/work/IP.htm;
INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 68; NAS REPORT, supra note 42; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA (2002), available at
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf;
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even been subject to legislative proposal, but, so far, Congress has not
yet enacted any legislation to balance patent rights and public health,
other than a very minor exception from liability for doctors using
some types of patented medical procedures. However, the Metabolite
opinion may help provide momentum for such efforts.
In reconsidering the role of patentable subject matter, as well as
the intersection between patents and public health, a more critical
consideration of whether patents truly promote innovation, as well as
whether a broad scope of patentable subject matter is important, needs
to be closely examined. After all, despite strong rhetoric from
lobbying groups and some judicial opinions, the empirical evidence is
more mixed. Patents have been traditionally viewed as important in
some industries, such as health care and chemical industries. 92
However, some have suggested that patents merely promote copying
of popular drugs,93 as well as searches for "blockbuster" drugs that
will be commercially successful, even if not truly novel.94 Moreover,
whether patents are necessary to promote development of new
medical procedures is even more controversial. For example, when
Congress last considered whether to bar medical procedures from the
scope of patentable subject mater, some suggested that, in contrast to
pharmaceuticals, medical procedures are typically developed during
the course of medical practice and are inexpensive to develop, such
that a patent incentive may not be necessary. 95 However, even the
medical profession admitted that if such procedures were barred from
THE ROYAL SOC'Y, KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE (2003), available at
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id= 11403.
92. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 35-36. Additionally, in industries that are
new to patent protection, such as software and business methods, the relevance of a patent
incentive is even more questionable since they have clearly succeeded before patents were
granted.
93. Worse yet, some contend that the exclusivity tied to patent rights is associated with
bad faith attempts to extend patent exclusivity with minor modifications. Mark A. Lemley &
Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 63, 80 (2004).
94. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 52-58 (2004) (asserting that from 1998-2002 only
14% of the total amount of new drugs reviewed by FDA were "innovative," and that most of
them originated from publicly-supported research).
95. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THE PATENTING OF MEDICAL PROCEDURES 1-2 (1995), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja la95.pdf. In addition to questioning
the need for a patent incentive, the same report noted that the existence of such patents had
negative ramifications for the practice of medicine since doctors would often be unaware of the
existence of such patents until they were sued. Id.
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patentability, the lack of a patent incentive might result in some
procedures being underdeveloped.96
When the impacts of patents are considered on a national or
global scale, the import of strong patents or broad patentable subject
matter is even less clear. Part of the problem may be that it is
impossible to do true scientific research with control groups since any
country that does not provide patents could be seen as necessarily
free-riding on the innovative efforts of countries that do provide
patent systems. On the other hand, researchers have not conclusively
found that introduction or strengthening of a patent system
necessarily spurs innovation.97 In addition, the type of innovation that
is promoted may also differ. For example, India successfully
promoted innovation in new methods as well as development of a
generic drug industry when it consciously made the decision to only
grant process patents for pharmaceuticals. Although the scope of
patentable subject matter was intentionally restricted, it had the
intended effect of promoting innovation in new processes while
simultaneously allowing competition to reduce the price of necessary
drugs. 98 Also, while innovative firms may have patents, there is not
necessarily a correlation between extensive patenting and extensive
innovation. Although patent protection may generally promote
innovation, it may more fundamentally promote strategic behavior.99
C. Can Policy Goals Trump Clever Claim Drafting?
A final consideration is whether patent policy goals or standards
may nonetheless be circumvented through clever claim drafting.
Although claim-drafting considerations do not answer fundamental
policy questions, claims are crucial in determining an invention's
96. Id. at 5.
97. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ch. 8, at 7-13 (2005), http://www.dklevine.com/papers/ip.ch.8.m1004.pdf,
NAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 40.
98. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of
India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation 25-30 (Aug. 16, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=923538; Dwijen Rangnekar, No Pills for
Poor People? Understanding the Disembowelment of India's Patent Regime 6-8 (Centre for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Univ. of Warwick, Working Paper No. 176/05,
2005), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2005/wp I 7605.pdf.
99. See KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING
THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 43-48, 53-55 (2000) (illustrating with real world examples that
patents are indeed important in today's corporate strategic decision-making).
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patentability and the scope of any issued patent. 100 Moreover, claim
drafting is an art that sometimes permits patents to issue that seem
inconsistent with intended policies. For example, with respect to the
issue of whether computer software should be patentable, for many
years the rule was that software per se was unpatentable, but, when
combined with hardware, patent protection was available. '0'
Accordingly, able claim drafters always included some hardware in
claims to obtain patent protection.
In addition, Canada's recent experience with bright line bars
against patentability for living organisms suggest that claim drafting,
together with claim construction, may have interesting results. The
Canadian Supreme Court took a bold step in finding higher life forms
unpatentable in Harvard College v. Canada, despite contrary rulings
in all other industrialized countries. 102 In doing so, the Canadian
Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the biotechnology industry
that such patents were essential. However, a few years later, the
Canadian Supreme Court (albeit with a slightly different group of
judges) held a genetically modified plant to be patentable. 10 3 More
precisely, the court rejected defendant Schmeiser's contention that the
claims should be unpatentable based on Harvard. 104 Rather, the court
found that because the claims were directed to the cellular level,
rather than to the entire plant, they were valid - despite the fact that
both claims would have the same result in prohibiting others from
making, using, or selling the genetically altered plant.'15 While it is
possible to consider the two Canadian Supreme Court decisions to
merely reflect the positions of different judges, it is also possible to
100. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. U.S., 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. C1. 1967) (focusing on
meaning of claims as critical to determining the scope of patent rights); U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (8th ed. 2006)
(noting that each claim should be reviewed to determine whether it constitutes patentable subject
matter).
101. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Examination Guidelines
for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7,478 (Feb. 28, 1996). See also European Patent
Convention, supra note 36, art. 52(2) (excluding from the scope of patentable invention not only
discoveries and scientific theories, but also methods of doing business, computer programs, and
presentations of information); Andreas Grosche, Software Patents - Boon or Bane for Europe?,
14 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 257, 271, 275 (2006) (noting test cases, TI 173/97, T935/97, and
T258/03, the latter of which held that a method of conducting Dutch auction using a computer
program was patentable since it comprised technical features).
102. Harvard College v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).
103. Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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consider the cases as emblematic of the power of careful claim
drafting to elude whatever current judicial or legislative bars exist.
D. What Is at Stake - International Implications?
International implications pose a final consideration in a
comprehensive view of the scope of patentable subject matter. The
international context is important not just because of the typical
comparative lessons that can be learned, but because the United States
has often led the development of patent law worldwide. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty was the first judicial decision to declare living matter
patentable and prompted other countries to modify their patent laws in
hopes of emulating the success of the U.S. biotechnology industry.
0 6
Moreover, the United States has played an active role in global patent
laws through its role in development of international agreements. For
example, the United States played a leading role in creating the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS"), 107 a landmark international agreement, which established
the first-ever minimum levels of patent rights on a global scale.
10 8
After TRIPS, most countries can no longer decide whether or not to
grant patents as a matter of purely domestic policy - at least not
without fear of being in violation of TRIPS and being subject to either
trade sanctions under the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
highly effective dispute settlement procedures, 109 or subject to
unilateral trade sanctions by the United States. "
0
106. See, e.g., Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July
1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13; see also
Commission of the European Communities, Biotechnology in the Community, at 34, COM
(1983) 672 final/2-Annex (noting the necessity of taking actions "for the promotion of
competitiveness in modem biotechnology" in Europe). But see Harvard College v. Canada,
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (declining to interpret a similarly-worded scope of patentable subject matter
to permit patenting of higher life forms in a narrow 5-4 decision).
107. See TRIPS, supra note 36. The new patent requirements are binding on all member
states of the comprehensive World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Because of the breadth of the
WTO membership, TRIPS effectively established near universal requirements of patent rights.
See Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (providing list of 150 member
states).
108. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-2 (2003) (describing the impact of a dozen U.S.-based
executives in building multilateral support for TRIPS).
109. All agreements under the WTO are enforceable under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, which is generally understood as one of the most effective international methods
of ensuring compliance. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round. Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.
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Ironically, if the scope of patentable subject matter is ultimately
determined to be overly broad in the United States, it will be in the
odd position of having exported requirements that are unsound from a
policy perspective. The problem is more than a theoretical one since
the United States has been aggressively entering into bilateral and
regional agreements with ever-increasing standards of patent rights,
including heightened requirements for patentable subject matter."'
For example, whereas some countries would prefer not to permit
patents on new methods of using pre-existing compositions, the
United States has required such patents by decree in certain bilateral
agreements.112 Moreover, even if a broad scope of patentable subject
matter is sound policy in the United States, the lack of empirical
evidence showing that patent policy necessarily results in economic
prosperity suggests that applying a "one-size-fits-all" patent standard
is questionable. While a complete discussion of the international
implications of exporting U.S. patent standards is beyond the scope of
this article, international repercussions should nonetheless be
considered at all times given the current policy of imposing ever-
increasing levels of patent protection 13 In addition, even for countries
not subject to trade pressures, since U.S. patent laws are often
INT'L L. 275, 303-04 (1997); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and
New Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (2004).
110. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND
2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM pt. V, at 226 (2006), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/ReportsPublications/2006/2006_TradePolicy_
Agenda/asset upload file922_9075.pdf.
111. For a list of existing and pending trade agreements entered into by the United States,
see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/SectionIndex.html.
112. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-
Oman, art. 15.8.1, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/OmanFTA/FinalText/assetupload-fi
le715_8809.pdf ("confirm[ing]" that patents are available for known products for treatment of
medical conditions).
113. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has a strong mandate to continue to
negotiate and implement trade agreements with ever-stronger terms for intellectual property
laws. See, e.g., Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-2 10, § 2102(b)(4)(A)(i)(II), 116 Stat. 933,
995-96 (2002) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. III 2005)) (noting that a
primary objective of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property rights is to
ensure that "provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement ... entered into by the
United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law"). For a
further discussion of the patent policy and health issues involved with trade agreements, see
Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order For Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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influential for economically similar nations, a heightened
consideration of patentable subject matter policy and related
implications seems reasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though Metabolite did not provide the immediate
satisfaction of a decisive standard of patentable subject matter, the
dissenting opinion provides some important lessons for the near
future. At a minimum, it highlights some policy considerations for
discussion by other institutional actors. Hopefully, Metabolite will
help promote greater consideration of not only the proper scope of
patentable subject matter, but also the overall patent system - in both
the domestic and international arenas.
* * *
